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CASE COMMENTS 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY LAW,  
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PROBLEMS:  
JONES, GPS TRACKING, AND THE FUTURE OF PRIVACY 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) 
Lauren Millcarek

 
In 2004, law enforcement officers began investigating Antoine 
Jones, a Washington, D.C. nightclub owner, for suspected drug 
trafficking.
1
 After gathering information through stakeouts, cameras, 
and a wiretap on Jones’ phone, the officers obtained a warrant to place a 
Global Positioning System (GPS) tracker on Jones’ wife’s car, which 
Jones possessed and used regularly.
2
 However, the officers failed to 
comply with the precise terms of the warrant,
3
 making the installation 
and use of the tracker warrantless. The officers tracked the car’s every 
movement, twenty-four hours per day, for an entire month.
4
 The data 
linked Jones to a stash house containing a great deal of cash and 
cocaine.
5
  
Based partially on this evidence, the Government charged Jones in 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia with conspiracy to 
distribute and possess cocaine.
6
 Jones moved to suppress the GPS 
tracking evidence.
7
 The trial court granted Jones’ motion in part: it 
suppressed the tracking evidence obtained while the car was parked at 
his house, but it admitted the evidence obtained while he was driving.
8
 
                                                                                                                                           
  J.D. 2012, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.A. 2009, University of 
Florida. I thank the members and staff of the Florida Law Review, with whom it was a pleasure 
and privilege to have worked for the past two years. I am truly honored to have a piece 
published in this distinguished journal. 
 1. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012). 
 2. Id. The Court briefly determined that there was no standing issue regarding Jones’ 
status as only a user and not the owner of the car. Id. at 949 n.2.  
 3. Id. at 948. The warrant allowed for the tracker to be placed on the car in D.C. and 
within ten days of the warrant’s issue. However, the officers placed the tracker in Maryland and 
on the eleventh day. Id. The Government conceded that the officers did not comply with the 
warrant. Id. at 948 n.1. 
 4. Id. at 948. The tracker produced 2,000 pages of data over the course of twenty-eight 
days. Id. 
 5. Id. at 948–49. By “great deal,” I mean more than three-quarters of a million dollars in 
cash and nearly 100 kilograms of cocaine. Id. 
 6. Id. at 948. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. This split ruling was based on the law created by the beeper tracker cases, which 
held that tracking an item’s movements on public roads was not a search, but tracking an item 
into the privacy of a home was a search. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281, 285 
1
Millcarek: Eighteenth Century Law, Twenty-First Century Problems: Jones, GPS
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
1102 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
The trial resulted in a hung jury, but when Jones was indicted again on 
the same charges, he was convicted and sentenced to life in prison.
9
  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
reversed the conviction, reasoning that the warrantless search violated 
the Fourth Amendment.
10
 The circuit court denied an en banc rehearing, 
and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
11
 The issue in the case 
was whether the installation of the GPS device on the car and the use of 
the device to monitor the car for a month was a “search” within the 
ambit of the Fourth Amendment.
12
 The unanimous
13
 Court answered 
that question in the affirmative, holding that the attachment coupled 
with the use of the GPS device was a “search.”14 The Court did not, 
however, answer the larger question as to whether the use, by itself, of 
GPS trackers was constitutionally permissible; but the concurring 
opinions point to where the Court may soon end up on that issue.
15
 
To answer the very narrow question on which it actually based its 
decision, the Court resorted to some very old jurisprudence: trespass 
doctrine. This doctrine was first created in the 1928 case of Olmstead v. 
United States,
16
 in which the defendants violated Prohibition by 
conspiring to “import, possess and sell” alcohol.17 Federal officers 
warrantlessly wiretapped the defendants’ telephones from outside their 
houses, without physically trespassing onto the defendants’ property; 
the conversations intercepted by the wiretaps led to the defendants’ 
arrests.
18
 The Court held that because there was no trespass—that is, no 
“actual physical invasion” of the defendants’ property—there was no 
Fourth Amendment search.
19
 
This doctrine persisted for nearly forty years, until Olmstead was 
overruled by Katz v. United States.
20
 In Katz, the defendant was 
                                                                                                                                           
(1983); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715–18 (1984). For a fuller discussion of Knotts, 
see infra notes 34–40 and accompanying text.   
 9. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948–49. 
 10. Id. at 949. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id. at 948. 
 13. The decision was unanimous, but there were three separate opinions: a five-Justice 
majority opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, a concurrence written by Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor (who also joined the majority), and a concurrence in judgment written by Justice 
Samuel A. Alito and joined by the three other Justices in the minority. See infra notes 41, 53, 
68. 
 14. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. 
 15. See infra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
 16. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 17. Id. at 455. 
 18. Id. at 456–57. 
 19. Id. at 466. 
 20. 389 U.S. at 347. 
2
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convicted of placing interstate telephone bets.
21
 He made the bets from 
a public phone booth, without knowing that federal agents had attached 
an electronic listening device to the outside of the booth, without 
physically entering into it.
22
 The appellate court affirmed the 
defendant’s conviction on the basis of Olmstead because no physical 
trespass had occurred.
23
 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
because the defendant sought to preserve the privacy of his conversation 
by entering and closing the door of the phone booth,
24
 rather than 
“knowingly expos[ing the conversation] to the public,”25 the 
conversation was protected and a Fourth Amendment search occurred 
when the agents intercepted it.
26
 The Court emphasized that “the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places,”27 and so “[t]he fact that the 
electronic device employed to achieve [the interception of the private 
conversation] did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have 
no constitutional significance.”28 Therefore, the Court overruled 
Olmstead and stated that “the reach of [the Fourth] Amendment cannot 
turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion,”29 apparently 
laying the trespass doctrine to rest.  
The concurrence by Justice John Marshall Harlan II formed the real 
takeaway
30
 from Katz.
31
 He set forth a two-pronged test for determining 
when a Fourth Amendment search occurs, which came to be the 
prevailing standard: first, the defendant must have “an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy,” and second, that expectation must 
“be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”32 Because 
the defendant in Katz clearly expected his conversation to be private (as 
                                                                                                                                           
 21. Id. at 348.  
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 348–49. 
 24. Id. at 352. 
 25. Id. at 351. 
 26. Id. at 359. 
 27. Id. at 351. The argument between the Government and the defendant in Katz was 
actually focused on another issue: whether the phone booth was a constitutionally protected 
area. Id. Because the Court decided that it was the private conversation conveyed by the person 
that was protected, not the space itself, that question was never answered. Ironically, the 
reinvigoration of trespass doctrine by the Court in the instant case has again raised the (as-yet 
unanswered) question of whether a phone booth is considered a constitutionally protected place.  
 28. Id. at 353 (emphasis added). 
 29. Id.  
 30. It is worth noting that Justice Harlan read the Katz majority opinion to hold “that 
electronic as well as physical intrusion into a place” may be a search. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added). While many may have believed that the overruling of Olmstead 
and the language of the majority opinion in Katz closed the book on the trespass doctrine, 
Justice Harlan’s language suggests otherwise and, in that sense, left the page marked, allowing 
the doctrine to be later revitalized. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 361. 
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he shut the door to the phone booth), and society would generally agree 
that a phone booth “is a temporarily private place whose momentary 
occupants’ expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as 
reasonable,” a search had occurred.33 
United States v. Knotts
34
 clarified the Katz test as it applied to the 
use of electronic tracking devices. In Knotts, police placed a beeper 
tracker
35
 into a tub of chloroform that was then sold to the defendant; 
the tracker was placed in the tub before purchase with the seller’s 
consent.
36
 The police tracked the tub (and its accompanying vehicle) 
over public roadways to the defendant’s cabin, where he was running a 
meth lab.
37
 The Court held that “[a] person travelling in an automobile 
on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements from one place to another.”38 The movements of the tub and 
the vehicle were visible to anyone and “voluntarily conveyed” to the 
public;
39
 so, the Court reasoned, the tracking of these movements did 
not violate any “legitimate expectation of privacy” and did not 
constitute a search under Katz.
40
 
Coming into the instant case, it appeared as if the Katz “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” formulation would decide the issue of whether 
the installation and use of the GPS tracker was a search; after Knotts, it 
seemed that tracking a vehicle in public places was reasonable and 
constitutionally permissible. However, the Jones Court, in a majority 
opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia,
41
 looked much further back 
than Katz: all the way back to the meaning of the Fourth Amendment at 
the time of its adoption.
42
 According to this original meaning, a search 
was only a “search” if it involved physical trespass onto the defendant’s 
                                                                                                                                           
 33. Id.  
 34. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 35. A beeper tracker “is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which emits periodic 
signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver.” Id. at 277. Essentially, beeper trackers are the 
technological forerunners of GPS trackers. 
 36. Id. at 278. 
 37. Id. at 278–79. 
 38. Id. at 281. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 285. In United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715–18 (1984), the other major 
beeper tracker case, the Court held that tracking an item into the privacy of the home constituted 
a search. See supra note 8 for a joint statement of the holdings of Knotts and Karo. The Jones 
Court dismissed the Government’s reliance on both Knotts and Karo (which together suggested 
that the use of a tracker to track a vehicle in public was permissible) because the trackers in 
those cases were installed on the items before they came into the defendants’ possession, unlike 
in Jones. See infra notes 47–48 and accompanying text.  
 41. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts and Justices Anthony 
Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Sonia Sotomayor, the latter of whom also wrote a lengthy 
concurrence. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 947 (2012). 
 42. Id. at 949. 
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property
43—the logic posited by the overruled Olmstead. The Court 
noted the Katz test’s deviation from the traditional trespass-based 
jurisprudence, but contended that “Katz did not repudiate” the trespass 
test;
44
 instead, it argued, the Katz “test has been added to, not 
substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”45 The Court held that 
there must either be a physical trespass or a violation of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in order for there to be a Fourth Amendment 
“search.”46  
The Court then explained the distinction that allowed its holding 
without overturning Knotts: in Knotts, the tracker was installed before 
the object came into the defendant’s possession, whereas the opposite 
was true in the instant case.
47
 This, according to the Court, placed the 
defendant “on much different footing”48 than in previous electronic 
tracking cases. Because the installation of the tracker was a physical 
trespass that occurred during the defendant’s possession of the vehicle, 
there was a “search.” 
The Court put two important limitations on this old (but actually 
new) trespass test. First, a simple trespass alone is not enough—the 
trespass must be done for the purpose of obtaining information.
49
 The 
Court also noted that the trespass must be onto a protected area 
enumerated by the Fourth Amendment—that is, persons, houses, 
papers, or effects.
50
 Because in this case there was (1) a physical 
trespass (2) during the defendant’s possession (3) onto a constitutionally 
protected area (the car
51
) (4) for the purpose of gathering information, 
there was a “search.” Thus, the Court affirmed the appellate court and 
reversed Jones’ conviction.52  
                                                                                                                                           
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 950.  
 45. Id. at 952. 
 46. Id. at 950. 
 47. Id. at 951–52. 
 48. Id. at 952. 
 49. Id. at 951 n.5. For instance, if a policeman simply fell over onto a person’s property 
by accident, that would not constitute a “search,” though it may technically be a “trespass.” 
 50. Id. at 953; U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This limitation preserves the Court’s open fields 
doctrine, which was created by Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), and provides that 
law enforcement officers’ entrance for investigative purposes onto the open fields of one’s 
property, even though it may be a technical trespass, does not constitute a Fourth Amendment 
“search” because the fields surrounding one’s property are not part of the constitutionally 
protected area of the “house.”   
 51. A car is an “effect” for Fourth Amendment purposes. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 (citing 
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977), abrogated in part on other grounds by 
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 573 (1991)). 
 52. Id. at 954. The Court did not delve further into whether this particular search was 
unreasonable and unconstitutional. Thus, the question of whether the police need a warrant to 
install a GPS tracker remains open. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, What Jones Does Not Hold, VOLOKH 
5
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Justice Sonia Sotomayor concurred with the majority.
53
 She agreed 
that the Katz test was meant to augment, not to replace, the trespass 
test,
54
 concluding that the majority properly relied on the narrowest 
means of decision: “When the Government physically invades personal 
property to gather information, a search occurs. The reaffirmation of 
that principle suffices to decide this case.”55  
However, in a carefully worded understatement, Justice Sotomayor 
also noted that “[i]n cases of electronic or other novel modes of 
surveillance that do not depend upon a physical invasion on property, 
the majority opinion’s trespassory test may provide little guidance.”56 
She reasoned that long-term GPS tracking interferes with expectations 
of privacy on a much deeper level than the majority was willing to 
recognize, rightly noting that such surveillance creates “a precise, 
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a 
wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations.”57 Justice Sotomayor laid out some of the 
incredibly private movements that such invasive surveillance would 
capture and record for posterity: “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic 
surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, 
the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, 
the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on.”58 Her 
constitutional concern was that the public’s awareness that law 
enforcement may be monitoring and recording these activities “chills 
associational and expressive freedoms.”59 
Justice Sotomayor offered some thoughts on how the Katz analysis 
is impacted by the in-depth, precise nature of GPS tracking 
technology.
60
 She argued that the fact that electronic surveillance 
merely duplicates traditional surveillance is not dispositive as to 
whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy.
61
 Instead, she 
“would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will 
be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to 
                                                                                                                                           
CONSPIRACY (Jan. 23, 2012, 12:50 PM), http://volokh.com/2012/01/23/what-jones-does-not-
hold/. 
 53. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 54. Id. at 955.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. (quoting People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 59. Id. at 956. For a more general look at how police searches psychologically impact the 
public, see Nancy Leong, The Open Road and the Traffic Stop: Narratives and Counter-
Narratives of the American Dream, 64 FLA. L. REV. 305, 335 (2012). 
 60. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 61. Id. at 956. 
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ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual 
habits, and so on.”62  
The Justice also indicated her willingness to rethink the “premise 
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”63 Here, she 
reasserted a “degrees of privacy” argument first made by Justice 
Thurgood Marshall in dissent more than thirty years ago in Smith v. 
Maryland.
64
 Based on the Katz “knowingly exposed” formulation, the 
Court has long held that people have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the information that they “voluntarily” disclose to third 
parties—including the phone numbers they dial, the Web sites they 
visit, and their financial records.
65
 Justice Marshall dissented when the 
Court created this third-party disclosure approach in Smith, arguing that 
people still expect some degree of privacy in such information, despite 
its voluntary disclosure to certain entities.
66
 Justice Sotomayor similarly 
reasoned that this third-party disclosure, all-or-nothing approach “is ill 
suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of 
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying 
out mundane tasks.”67 The notion that we can simply avoid privacy 
disclosures altogether is unrealistic in modern society, so the 
assumption-of-risk argument underpinning the premise of the third-
party disclosure doctrine is fundamentally flawed. Just as one cannot 
avoid information disclosures to one’s phone company, Internet service 
provider, and bank, one similarly cannot avoid the disclosure of 
personal details collected in the sum total of one’s movements on public 
roadways. Thus, while Justice Sotomayor joined the backward-looking 
majority, her concurrence demonstrates the most forward-thinking 
rationale in the instant case. 
Justice Samuel A. Alito, in an opinion that falls between the 
majority and Justice Sotomayor on the spectrum of privacy rights, 
concurred in the judgment.
68
 He believed that Katz foreclosed the old 
trespass-based approach, and he would reinstitute the Katz test as the 
exclusive test for whether a Fourth Amendment search has occurred.
69
 
Justice Alito accused the majority of using eighteenth century law to 
solve a twenty-first century problem.
70
 While Justice Scalia posited that 
                                                                                                                                           
 62. Id.  
 63. Id. at 957. 
 64. Id. (citing 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
 65. Id. 
 66. 442 U.S. at 748 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 67. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 68. Id. (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, 
and Elena Kagan joined Justice Alito’s opinion. Id. 
 69. Id. at 959–60.  
 70. Id. at 957. 
7
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something analogous to twenty-four hour GPS surveillance could have 
been accomplished at the time of the Fourth Amendment’s adoption by 
“a constable’s concealing himself in the target’s coach in order to track 
its movements,”71 Justice Alito flippantly dismissed that hypothetical as 
requiring “a very tiny constable . . . with incredible fortitude and 
patience.”72  
Instead of the installation of the tracker being a search, Justice Alito 
argued, it is the use of the tracker that is of concern.
73
 He noted that 
such a triviality as “attaching to the bottom of a car a small, light object 
that does not interfere in any way with the car’s operation” is not 
actually interfering with the car owner’s possessory interest and so is 
essentially meaningless under trespass law, yet would constitute a 
search under the majority’s test.74 On the other hand, if “the Federal 
Government required or persuaded auto manufacturers to include a GPS 
tracking device in every car,” the use of such a tracker—without an 
accompanying installation—would not constitute a search.75 The Justice 
found this approach to be logically upside-down.  
Justice Alito’s approach would apply the Katz test to the instant case 
in a somewhat peculiar way, though. He believed that the four-week 
tracking in the instant case definitely violated society’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy, but he also posited that short-term tracking does 
not do so (and failed to explain where and when the line would be 
crossed).
76
 Because Justice Alito does not believe the installation itself 
of the device was a search, the implication is that warrantless 
installation and short-term tracking would not constitute a search under 
his theory. The Justice also noted that even long-term tracking may be 
reasonable if the crime is severe enough.
77
 (Presumably, he would 
require something more serious than the lifetime-imprisonment drug 
conspiracy in the instant case, though it is unclear what crime that 
would be.) While Justice Alito disagreed with the majority’s test, he 
believed that the long-term tracking in the instant case violated society’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Katz test and concurred 
with the majority that a search occurred.
78
 
So while the result was unanimous—a search occurred here—the 
reasoning was split 5–4, with the majority reinstating the trespass test 
and Justice Alito’s faction preferring the Katz test exclusively. 
                                                                                                                                           
 71. Id. at 950 n.3 (majority opinion). 
 72. Id. at 958 n.3 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). 
 73. Id. at 958. 
 74. Id. at 961. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 964.  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. 
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Undoubtedly, though, the warrantless installation together with the 
long-term use of a GPS tracker is a search. Unfortunately, the Jones 
case raises many more questions than this very specific one it answers.
79
  
First, is the trespass distinction necessary? After all, the law of 
trespass, in itself, is arguably a legally embodied (and therefore 
reasonable) expectation of privacy. Theoretically, then, the Katz test 
encompasses the trespass test and renders it unnecessary.
80
 This, 
however, is a mostly academic train of thought and one unlikely to 
make much of an impact on the Court. 
More importantly, the trespass test is ambiguous in one key respect: 
what is an enumerated protected area? That is, what exactly are the 
contours of “persons, houses, papers, and effects”? What about the 
archetypal Katz phone booth (if such a thing still exists)? And what 
about other analogues: is a hotel room, for instance, a temporary 
“house”? The Court gives us no guidance on this front, and Katz left 
this issue very much open.
81
  
And once one decides that installation of the device is a search of a 
protected area, then one must decide if it is unreasonable and 
unconstitutional. The presumption is that a warrantless search is 
unreasonable.
82
 The warrant requirement is inextricably intertwined 
here, yet the state of that law is left unsettled: the future weight of this 
decision on the warrant issue hinges on whether one of the Justices 
could cross camps in deciding whether warrantless installation coupled 
with short-term monitoring constitutes an unreasonable search.  
After all, the four-Justice concurrence in judgment already believes 
that the installation of the tracker on its own is not a search at all, let 
alone an unreasonable one. Just one member of the five-Justice majority 
would have to decide that even if the installation is a search, the short-
term monitoring is “sufficiently minor to not require a warrant,”83 
making the search reasonable. If that happens, law enforcement can 
install trackers and monitor them in the short-term with carte blanche. 
                                                                                                                                           
 79. See, e.g., Tom Goldstein, Jones Confounds the Press, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 25, 2012, 
11:30 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/jones-confounds-the-press/; Orin Kerr, Why 
United States v. Jones Is Subject to So Many Different Interpretations, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Jan. 30, 2012, 4:59 PM), http://volokh.com/2012/01/30/why-united-states-v-jones-is-subject-to-
so-many-different-interpretations/. 
 80. This would, of course, throw the open fields doctrine into question, which is a not-
insubstantial wrinkle in this navel-gazing exercise. For an explanation of the open fields 
doctrine, see supra note 50. 
 81. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. I thank Professor John Stinneford for 
pointing out this open question and for his helpful comments. 
 82. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). This presumption is, of course, 
subject to myriad exceptions. 
 83. Tom Goldstein, Reactions to Jones v. United States: The Government Fared Much 
Better than Everyone Realizes, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 23, 2012, 4:07 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=137698. 
9
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And because the ideological breakdown of the Justices in Jones is cross-
political, with several conservatives siding with the majority, it seems 
quite likely that one of them will eventually be willing to switch camps 
and side with the police to determine that warrantless installation with 
short-term monitoring constitutes a reasonable, constitutional search.
84
 
The warrant jurisprudence is vast and murky, and Jones offers a 
glimpse at a possible near-future. 
Most essentially, however, the majority punted on the real question 
raised by the instant case: what do we do about the invasive, long-term 
invasion of privacy created by limitless, technologically powered 
government surveillance?
85
 Under Jones, the police can still install 
trackers into your electronics before you come into possession of them 
and track you theoretically ad infinitum, without consequences. The 
GPS on your phone? Trackable. Your car’s built-in GPS? Trackable. 
Forever. As long as you are in public, you have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy over that information—so the police would not 
even be doing a “search,” under either Jones or Katz. You would have 
zero Fourth Amendment protection. So while Jones may seem, on its 
face, like a pro-privacy decision (police, you should probably get a 
warrant before you install a GPS tracker!), its implications cut very 
much the other way.
86
  
And yet, “the significance of Jones in this area of the law will fade 
pretty quickly.”87 Technology is constantly getting more sophisticated 
and law enforcement soon will no longer need to physically attach a 
tracker to property in order to perform round-the-clock surveillance.
88
 
                                                                                                                                           
 84. See id. (arguing that the Government “is more likely than not to prevail in a later case 
in which it installs a GPS monitor without a warrant and tracks the individual for only a couple 
of days”). However, it appears that the Government is less than certain about its eventual 
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Thus, this will likely turn out to be an important opinion by Justice 
Sotomayor, providing crucial clarifying dicta as to how to think about 
Katz and privacy in a time where technology is evolving much more 
rapidly than the law.
89
 Though she joins the majority, her pro-privacy 
stance creates a five-Justice majority with Justice Alito’s anti-Big 
Brother concurrence. If the right case were to come along, with no 
technical trespass but nonetheless a technologically created, 
unreasonable infringement on society’s privacy expectations, the 
privacy advocates could win the day. So while Jones clearly is not the 
last word in privacy and GPS surveillance, the unique breakdown of the 
Justices provides an intriguing hint as to where the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence may go next. 
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